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Abstract. This paper provides an overview of use rights, that sanction fishers, fisher groups and fishing communities to 
access and use fishery resources. The paper first reviews the various forms of use rights, ranging from access rights (territorial 
use rights and limited entry) to quantitative input (effort) and output (harvest) rights. It then explores the factors impacting on 
the determination of a desirable portfolio of use rights within specific circumstances. Given that there is no universally 
optimal arrangement, the choice will depend on such factors as (a) society’s objectives for the fishery, (b) the structure, 
history and traditions of the fishery, and (c) the relevant ecological, social, cultural and economic environment. Finally, the 
paper explores two major policy issues concerning use rights, concerning the choice between holding rights at the individual 
versus collective/group levels, and the choice among institutional arrangements for organizing use rights, specifically market-
based versus strategic planning mechanisms. 
 





Use rights sanction holders of those rights to access and 
harvest the fishery resource – perhaps subject to specific 
conditions imposed by society on fishing activity, 
behaviour, etc. The careful distribution, allocation and/or 
recognition of use rights can therefore be viewed as a 
response to the problems of open access. Accordingly, 
there is an emerging focus on use rights as crucial to 
success in fishery management. This is paralleled by a 
corresponding emphasis on management rights, the rights 
to participate in management decision making, perhaps 
through the approach of co-management, as a response to 
the failure of top-down fishery management.  
 
Both of these, use rights and management rights, are 
forms of property rights. Within this perspective, the focus 
of use rights on access and harvest contrasts with the set 
of  collective choice rights (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996)  
that include management rights as well as exclusion rights 
(to determine the qualifications necessary to hold use 
rights) and alienation rights  (authorising the transfer or 
sale of other rights). The idea of use rights is by no means 
new. Indeed, fishery use rights have existed for centuries; 
such rights, it seems, have most often been based on 
usufruct – the right to use another’s property, and benefit 
from that use, without diminishing or destroying that 
property (see, e.g., Symes 1998).  
 
The discussion of use rights in the present paper lies on 
two principal themes: (1) the various forms in which use 
rights can appear, and (2) the challenge of identifying a 
desired portfolio of use rights in a given situation. For 
more detailed treatment and a more complete bibliography 
on the subject, the reader is referred to Townsend and 
Charles (1995), Charles (2000) and Charles (2001). 
 
 
2. FORMS OF USE RIGHTS 
 
Use rights in fisheries can be considered through the 
posing of two broad questions:  
 
x Who can go fishing? 
x How much fishing can take place? 
 
This leads to the grouping of use rights within two 
categories, namely access rights and withdrawal (harvest) 
rights, each of which has two major components, as 




…refer to the capability to enter a fishery and 
participate in it (typically subject to constraints 
on how, when and where participation is 
allowed); the best-known forms are: 
 
Territorial Use Rights in Fishing (TURFs) 
…rights to engage in fishing within a certain 
specified geographical location 
 
Limited entry licenses 
…rights assigned through licensing, or other 
means, to limit participation. 
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Withdrawal (harvest) rights 
…refer most often to the intensity of resource 
use, as reflected in the level of fishing (input 
rights) and the quantity harvested (output rights): 
 
Input rights  
…concern the extent to which fishing activity is 
allowed to take place, involving rights to certain 
levels of fishing inputs such as fishing time, boat 
size, amount of gear, etc. 
 
Output rights  
…concern the allowable output of fishing, 
typically harvest of a certain specified quantity of 
fish, such as a fraction of a TAC (although a 
TAC is not a use right in itself). 
 
Note that the various forms of use rights may be held by 
various fishery participants: a fishery sector, a fisher 
organization, a fishing community, a corporation and/or 
an individual fisher. Each right can be subject to a range 


























Figure 1. A Framework of Fishery Use Rights 
 
 
2.2 Territorial Use Rights in Fishing 
 
Territorial Use Rights in Fishing (TURFs) involve the 
assignment of rights to individuals and/or groups to fish in 
certain locations, generally, although not necessarily, 
based on long-standing tradition (‘customary usage’). A 
classic reference on TURFs is that of Christy (1982: p.1), 
who noted that “as more and more study is given to the 
culture and organisation of fishing communities, there are 
indications that some forms of TURFs are more pervasive 
than previously thought to be the case, in both modern and 
traditional marine fisheries.” While TURFs are often 
identified with developing regions, there are many 
important cases in developed areas, as in coastal Japan 
(e.g., Ruddle 1989) and in lobster fisheries on the north-
eastern coast of North America (Acheson, 1975; 
Brownstein and Tremblay, 1994). Unfortunately, TURF 
systems are often poorly understood by governments, and 
their potential value in management is not fully 
recognised. Indeed, in some fishery systems, TURFs may 
be among the most effective forms of management 
(Ruddle  et al., 1992). This is especially so if implemented 
and regulated so as to avoid excessive transaction costs 
(e.g., perhaps within a framework of existing institutions), 
and/or if the resulting costs are out-weighed by the 
inherent value of the institution involved.  
 
 
2.3 Limited Entry 
 
Limited entry, in the form of a limited number of licenses 
to fish, specifies a use right - the right to participate in the 
fishery. Limited entry has been successful, in a number of 
fisheries, in demonstrably slowing the rate of expansion of 
fishing capacity, and generating substantial profits for 
license holders, as reflected in the high value of licenses. 
However, limited entry cannot, by itself, solve all fishery 
problems. In particular, it does not overcome the rush for 
the fish (in which each fisher seeks to catch the fish first) 
nor the corresponding incentive for capital stuffing – 
expanding each vessel’s fishing capacity beyond the level 
that would be ‘efficient’ for the fishery as a whole. The 
existence of these problems does not, however, negate the 
crucial nature of limited entry. Instead, it highlights the 
need for a ‘management portfolio’ that combines limited 
entry with tools such as quantitative allocations of inputs 




2.4 Effort Rights (Quantitative Input Rights) 
 
Input rights involve the assignment to individual fishers, 
groups or communities of allowable levels for such inputs 
as time fished, vessel size, amount of gear, and gear 
attributes. This can be a viable approach to management, 
as long as two key problems are dealt with. First, there is 
an incentive among fishers to manipulate the controlled 
inputs (perhaps through greater intensity of use) and to 
expand the unregulated inputs to achieve greater output. 
This implies the need for a multi-dimensional approach to 
input rights, by implementing rights over not one but a 
range of inputs. Second, there is a natural process of 
technological improvement that gradually increases the 
effectiveness of any set of inputs over time. If monitoring 
of this effect, and subsequent adjustments, are not carried IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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out, the conservation impact of fishing by a given fleet 
(even one with a constant number of boats) may be under-
estimated, leading to over-exploitation. An individual 
input program must therefore adjust for such 
improvements in fishing efficiency, perhaps by reducing 
the aggregate level of allowable inputs over time, to 
reflect the rate of efficiency increase. 
 
 
2.5 Harvest Quotas (Quantitative Output Rights) 
 
A Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is a conservation control 
but not a use right, since setting a TAC makes no 
statement about the rights to catch the fish. The situation 
changes, however, if that TAC is subdivided to sectors of 
the fishery, individual fishers, or communities, in which 
case these shares of the TAC represent quantitative output 
rights - collective or individual use rights over the 
corresponding ‘shares’. Several variations may occur: 
 
x The rights may be held and managed collectively by a 
sector  of the fishery (e.g., with specific allocations 
made for small boats or for large boats, for hook-and-
line fishers or for net fishers, etc.); 
x The rights may be assigned to communities, as 
community quotas, so that not only is collective 
control exerted, but decisions on use of the quota can 
explicitly reflect community values and objectives.  
x The rights may be allocated to individual fishers, 
either within a fishing season, as trip limits or on an 
annual basis through individual quotas (IQs) that may 
be transferable (ITQs) or nontransferable (INTQs). 
 
Just as input rights systems face undesirable incentives, as 
noted above, so too must harvest rights systems deal with 
incentives to thwart output controls, through under-
reporting of catches, and through dumping, discarding and 
high-grading of catches. Efforts to deal with these 
problems include various approaches to monitoring of 
catches and of at-sea behaviour.  
 
3. CHOOSING A USE RIGHTS SYSTEM 
 
The preceding discussion has outlined the range of 
possible use rights options. Here, we turn to the 
fundamental issue of putting a use rights system into 
place. This involves addressing three key questions: 
 
x Is an effective system of use rights already in place 
within the given fishery? 
x If not, what use rights options, or set of options, are 
best for the given fishery? 
x What fishery policies guide how the desired option(s) 
should be implemented? 
 
3.1 Are use rights already in place? 
 
In existing fisheries, particularly those with a long history, 
it may well be that use rights have already developed 
naturally over time, perhaps put in place by fishers 
themselves or by their community. It is not surprising that 
use rights would have emerged, since there are clear 
benefits to defining the group of fishers entitled to fish in 
a certain location, both for the fishers themselves and for 
the well-being of the fishing community. Social scientists 
have played a major role in documenting not only existing 
‘indigenous’ use rights systems, but also systems that had 
been in place in the past, but which were displaced by 
‘modern’ central management. In many cases, the process 
of understanding local use rights accompanies that of 
accessing local knowledge about the fishery and its 
environment – so-called traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK). If use rights already exist, it is crucial to 
understand how effective those use rights are, and whether 
there are available mechanisms to reinforce them. 
Certainly, it is likely more efficient to accept and reinforce 
existing rights than to attempt the development and 
enforcement of an entirely new regime.  
 
 
3.2 What is the ‘best’ set of use rights? 
 
Suppose that either no use rights system is in place, or that 
if use rights do exist, there is a recognised need for 
substantial changes. Then what is the preferred use rights 
option? This is a major question, but addressing it 
requires recognition that (1) the world’s fisheries are 
highly diverse biologically, economically and socially, 
and (2) the relative impacts of the various advantages and 
limitations inherent within each use rights approach vary 
from fishery to fishery.  
 
Given these two points, what is ‘best’ will depend on the 
fishery in question, and it is important to understand how 
particular fishery circumstances influence the desirability 
of certain options over others. Clearly, it is unlikely that 
any single use rights approach will produce optimal 
results in every fishery, so it may be preferable to pursue a 
portfolio of rights – a combination that is most acceptable, 
helps the fishery operate best, and maximizes benefits, 
within the given context. To this end, it is important to 
understand the structure and underlying nature of the 
fishery: 
 
x What are society’s objectives in the fishery? 
x What are the fishery’s  structure, history, traditions? 
x What are the relevant social, cultural and economic 
environments? 
x What are the key features of the fish and ecosystem? 
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Responses to these questions might guide our choices, 
even while recognizing that there is no consensus about 
which use rights options are most compatible with which 
fishery features. For example, sedentary fishery resources 
may be especially amenable to TURFs. Stocks for which 
biomass estimates are unreliable, or for which regular 
catch monitoring is too expensive, may be best 
approached through effort rights, while highly migratory 
or transboundary stocks, for which the allowable catch 
must be allocated among nations, may focus on harvest 
rights. Fisheries in which the technology is relatively 
uniform may be able to effectively utilize input rights, 
while in fisheries with many different gear types, harvest 
rights may work better. Of course, in a given case, the 
importance of each of the fishery characteristics must be 
weighed in assessing the pro’s and con’s of use rights 
options, before arriving at a desired solution.   
 
 
3.3 What policy issues must be considered? 
  
Two key issues are outlined here: the choice between 
individual and collective (group) rights, and that between 
market-based and community-based rights.  
 
Individual vs. Collective Rights 
 
A crucial aspect about use rights is the difference between 
those instituted at the level of the individual fisher and 
those at a collective level – e.g., the community or the 
fisher association. A choice between these should depend 
on both the historical context and the fishery objectives 
being pursued. For example, in a fishery that has 
developed relatively recently, and that has an industrial 
focus, there may be a natural inclination to an individual 
rights system. On the other hand, collective rights are 
historically of greatest importance in longstanding 
traditional fisheries. The feasibility of collective rights 
may well depend on such factors as the cohesiveness of 
the community involved, experience in and capacity for 
local management, geographical clarity of the community, 
and its overall size and extent. For those cases where such 
rights already exist, or where the conditions are conducive 
to their introduction, it is useful to document the potential 
benefits of collective rights (as in ‘community quotas’ for 
example). For example, can the community, through 
moral pressure on local fishers and suitable management 
institutions, create a collective incentive for resource 
stewardship and effective local enforcement? 
 
Institutional Mechanism: Market vs. Strategic Planning 
 
A key issue in use rights concerns the choice between two 
institutional arrangements for determining who are to be 
the fishery participants – a market-based approach, and 
one based on multi-objective strategic planning. The 
former involves a reliance on market forces, as in ITQ 
systems, with fishery participation and allocation of 
allowable catch or effort determined through the buying 
and selling of rights. In economies dominated by markets, 
these may be relatively easily-implemented rights systems. 
Broadly speaking, such a system can be expected to 
display the various advantages and disadvantages of the 
overall market system. In contrast, a strategic planning 
approach assigns use rights in a more deliberate manner 
through a multi-objective decision making process. This is 
carried out by institutions operating at the relevant scale 
(whether community-based, regional or national), with 
rights specified through a combination of legislation, 
government decisions and traditional/informal rules, and 
with those rights operating at either the individual fisher 
level or at the group (collective) level. 
 
Which of these arrangements will be more efficient is an 
empirical matter, dependent on the perspective of interest. 
For example, vessel efficiency may be higher in a market 
approach but community/regional economic efficiency 
may be higher in a strategic planning approach. The latter 
could occur if community group dynamics lessen conflict 
and raise management efficiency, or if a market approach 
leads to social dislocation and lower regional benefits. 
While the particulars of a given situation are crucial, it 
may be possible, in the spirit of Berkes’ (1986) analysis, 
to hypothesize some basic directions: 
 
x A strategic planning approach may be appropriate if 
the fishery structure is small-scale/artisanal with clear 
ties between fishers and their communities. A market 
based approach may be suitable if the fishery has a 
predominantly industrial, capital-intensive focus. 
x A strategic planning approach may be preferable if 
history and tradition play a major role in fishing 
activity and management, while a market approach 
may be suitable if the fishery does not play a major 
role in supporting coastal communities. 
x A strategic planning approach may be most feasible  
if there are multiple fishery and non-fishery goals, 
and if fishery management requires the balancing of 
these objectives. On the other hand, a market 
approach may be desired if profitability dominates 
over community and socioeconomic goals such as 
equity, employment, and health of the local economy. 
 
It should be noted that intermediate options may also be 
considered. These include individual-based, non-market 
schemes, such as a community quota that is managed 
cooperatively, but with sub-divisions into non-transferable 
individual quotas, or a local trap fishery on a sedentary 
species that is managed through collectively-developed 
policy but individual (trap limit) input rights. Such 
approaches may best balance the desirability of individual 






This paper has provided but a brief, introductory 
treatment of a major subject in fishery management. By 
way of conclusions, it may be worthwhile reiterating three 
fundamental points. First, use rights are clearly crucial in 
the world’s fisheries. Second, use rights already exist in 
many fisheries, and indeed, in  many cases such rights 
evolved naturally. Third, if use rights do not exist, or 
current rights are ineffective, the problem arises as to how 
best to develop and implement an appropriate system. It 
has been suggested here that use rights may be best seen 
within the context of a portfolio, a suitable combination of 
input and output rights, qualitative and quantitative rights. 
In any case, choices will arise, and two of the major ones 
concern (a) rights being held by individuals or by groups 
and communities, and (b) the dynamics of rights holdings 
being driven by the market, or by planning approaches.  
 
The challenges of determining a suitably feasible and/or 
effective use rights portfolio require sensitivity to a wide 
range of ecological, economic and sociocultural factors. It 
can be noted in particular that while economic factors are 
clearly relevant in assessing the effectiveness and cost of 
use rights options, it is at least as important to consider  
biological aspects (such as fish behaviour, migration and 
such) and social aspects (such as traditional means of 
management, cultural constraints on fishing, etc.). 
 
This has implications both for research and management. 
First, it is likely that a useful understanding of use rights 
in fisheries requires interdisciplinary research. Second, in 
terms of management, the need to consider biological, 
social and economic factors reflects the reality that any 
single use rights option – ITQs, say – may be suitable 
under some ecological and social scenarios, but not under 
others. It is important therefore to develop an improved 
understanding of the various determinants of success in 
use rights arrangements, and to develop a practical, multi-
dimensional process to assess the match of fisheries and 
use rights options, on a case by case basis.  
 
Without such tools in place, there is a risk that use rights 
arrangements may be implemented too much on an ad hoc 
basis. For example, in the absence of objective means to 
assess use rights implications in a given fishery, choices 
may be made based on the preferences of managers, 
consultants or funding agencies. Likewise, in the absence 
of suitable interdisciplinary assessments, the perspective 
on use rights may be excessively that of a single discipline 
– economics, say.  Such concerns speak strongly for an 
integrated approach to research, assessment, and where 
required, implementation of use rights approaches. This 
should indeed be a key priority for dealing with use rights 
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